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No. 73-362 
MORTON (Secretary of the 
Interior) 
v. 






MANCARI (Employee of BIA -
non-Indian) 
~from THREE-JUDGE 
D N. Mexico 
(Seth, Bratton, Meechem, 
memorandum) 
Appeal from THREE-JUDGE 
USDC D N. Mexico 




1. This is a direct appeal brought under 28 U.S. C. 1253 from a 
ees 




and statutory gJOunds, the Congressional enactments giving Indians preference -
for employment in the BIA. The court found that the Acts were implicity 
repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 and granted 
relief on that ground without reaching the constitutional question. The 
Secretary and an intervenor, a non-profit organization representing the 
Indian employees, appeal. 
2. FACTS: Appellees, employees of the .BIA with less than 25% 
Indian blood, brought this class action in .the USDC D Arizona seeking an 
injunction against the operation of the Indian Preference statutes, 25 
u.s.c. 44-46, 472. The Plaintiffs are teachers and programers employed 
by the BIA. They testified as to particular training and advancement 
opportunities which they claim were denied them because they were not 
eligible for the statutory preference. They attacked: (1) the construction 
of these statutes employed by the Secretary under which he gave a preference 
to persons of Indian blood in initial hiring, training and promotion; (2) - the 
continued vitality of these acts in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1972; 
(3) - the constitutionality of these acts under the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. The court declined to pass on the exact scope of the ---
preferential treatment mandated by the statutes (See. Freeman v. Morton 
. 
CADC - unreported - in intervenors appx. ). Instead, it held that the 
statutes had been tacitly repealed by the Equal Employment law and that, 
. 
un~r that law, the preferences were ille ~al. - .. The court did not pass on the 
constitutional objections to the statute but did note that ' ' Under these 
circumstances, we could well hold that the statute must fail on constitutional 
grounds, but instead we hold as above described that the preference statutes 
must give way to the Civil Rights Act." 
- 3 -
Justice Marshall has stayed the injunction pending final action by this Court. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellant argues that the question is substantial 
---
since the preference statutes provide jobs for the Tribal Indians, and ensure 
that governmental relations with the Tribes through the BIA and the field will 
be "informed by the special sensitivity which those who belong to the 
beneficiary-minority can bring to the federal Indian program.'' The 
//government argues that nothing in the Equal Employment Act indicates repeal 
~ of the Indian Preference acts and that no conflict should be expected since 
both have the same basic end -- the protection of minority employment. The 
SG also argues that the preferences do not violate any constitutional mandate. 
The preferences are availabl_e only to members of Tribes whose affairs are 
administered by BIA and, therefore, argues the SG, the statutes are not 
strictly racial legislation. Additionally, he argues, the Indian Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution recognizes the Indian tribes as separate nations 
dependent upon the U.S. and justifies special laws granting the Indians 
special privileges not available to the entire population. 
The intervenor in No. 73-364 makes essentially the same argumerts 
d--
as the SG. 
4. DISCUSSION: The question is an important one to the administra-
I 
tion of the BIA ald one not clearly decided correctly by the CA. The argument ~ 
of the SG on the interpretation of the statutes are not easily dismissed. Befor e: 
acting on the case, ho-wever, a response should be requested from the 
appellees. This should shed additional light on the jurisdictional question 
and the strene;th of the SG' s statutory analysis. 
There is no response. 










(Seth, Bratton, Meechem, 
memorandum) 
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No. 73-362 Response Re~ed 
Morton (Sec. of Interior) v. Mancari 
The response adds nothing. I think I would summarily 
reverse, without oral argument. One or .. two Justices may, 
however, want to hear the case to try to reach the question of 
the constitutionality of ben~treatment of racial minorities. 
E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard,No. 73-235 (Washington law school 
compensatory admissions policy case). Although the USDC tipped 
its hand as to how it would decide this constitutional question, 
.. it in fact did not decide it. Thus, ~ constitutional issue 
is not before the Court. I would reverse on the basis of the 
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To: The Chief Justioe 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White y 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
From: Blackmun, J. 
1st DRAFT 
Circulated: ~ / 11 / z'( 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - "--1"7 ~, ...<....t--
Recirculated: ____________ _ 
NOS. 73-362 AND 73-364 
Rogers, C. B. Morton, Secre-
tary of the Interior, et al., 
Appellants, 
73-362 v. 
C. R. Mancari et al. 
Amerind, Appellant, 
73-364 v. 
C. R. Mancari et al. 
On Appeals from the 
United States District 
Court for the District of 
New Mexico. 
![June - , 19741 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 accords an 
employment preference for qualified Indians in the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs [BIA] . Appellees, non-Indian 
BIA employees, challenged this preference as contrary 
to the anti-discrimination provisions of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, and as violative of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A 
three-judge federal district court concluded that the In-
dian preference under the 1934 Act was impliedly re-
pealed by the 1972 Act. Mancari v. Morton, 359 F . 
Supp. 585 (N. M. 1973). We noted probable jurisdic-
tion in order to examine the statutory and constitutional 
validity of this longstanding Indian preference. 414 
u .. - (1974). 
... 
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I 
Section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act, also 
known as the Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 986 (1934), 
25 U.S. C.§ 472, provides: 
"The Secretary of the Interior is directed to es-
tablish standards of health, age, character, experi-
ence, knowledge, and ability for Indians who may 
be appointed, without regard to civil-service laws, 
to the various positions maintained, now or here-
after, by the Indian Office/ in the administration of 
functions or services affecting any Indian tribe. 
Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the pref-
erence to appointment to vacancies in any such 
positions." 2 
In June 1972, pursuant to this provision, the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, with the approval of the Secre-
tary of the Interior, issued a directive (Personnel Man-
agement Letter No. 72-12) stating that the BIA's 
policy would be to grant a preference to qualified Indians 
not only, as before, in the initial hiring sta.ge, but also 
in the situation where an Indian and a non-Indian, both 
already employed by the BIA, were competing for a pro-
motion within the Bureau.3 The record indicates that 
this policy was implemented immediately. 
1 The Indian Health Service was transferred in 1954 from the De-
partment of the Interior to the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. Act of August 5, 1954, § 1, 68 Stat. 674, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2001. Presumably, despite this transfer, the reference in § 12 to the 
"Indian Office" has continuing application to the Indian Health 
Service. 
2 There are earlier and more narrowly drawn Indian preference 
statutes. 25 U. S. C. §§ 44, 45,. 46, 47, and 274. For all practical 
purposes, these were replaced by the broader preference of § 12. 
Although not directly challrnged in this litigation, these statutes, 
under the District Court's deciswn, clearly would be invalidated. 
[Footnote 3 is on p. 3] 
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Shortly thereafter, appellees, who are non-Indian em-
ployees of the BIA at Albuquerque; instituted this class 
action, on behalf of themselves and other non-Indian 
employees similarly situated, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming that 
the "so-called 'Indian Preference Statutes' " were re-
pealed by the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
·and deprived them of rights to property without due 
process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendtnent.5 
Named as defendants were the Secretary of the Interior1 
3 The directive stated: 
"The Secretary of the Interior announced today [June 23, 1972] 
he has approved the Bureau's policy to extend Indian preference to 
training and to filling vacancies by original appointment, reinstate-
ment, and promotion. The new policy was discussed with the na-
tional president of the N a tiona! Federation of Federal Employees 
under national consultation rights NFFE has with the Department. 
Secretary Morton and I jointly stress that careful attention must 
be given to protecting the rights of non-Indian employees. The new 
policy provides as follows: Where two or more candidates who meet 
the established qualification requirements are available for filling a 
vacancy, if one of them is an Indian, he shall be given preference in 
filling the vacancy. This new policy is effective immediately and is 
incorporated into all existing programs such as the promotion pro-
gram. Revised manual releases will be issued promptly for review 
and comment. You should take immediate steps to notify all 
employees and recognized unions of this policy." 
4 The appellees state that none of them is employed on or near an 
Indian reservation. Brief for Appellees 8. The District Court 
described the appellees as "teachers .. . or programmers, or in com-
puter work." Mancari v. Morton, 359 F . Supp. 585, 587 (N. M. 
1973) . 
5 The specific question whether § 12 of the 1934 Act authorizes a 
preference in promotion as well as in initial hiring was not decided 
by the District Court and is not now before us. We express no 
opinion on this issue. See Freeman v. Morton, - U. S. App, 
D . C.-,- F . 2d- (1974) . See also Mescalero Apache Tnbe 
. v. Hickel, .432 F. 2d 956 (CAlO 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 981 
(1971) · (preference held inapplicable to reduction in force) . 
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the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the BIA Di-
rectors for the Albuquerque and Navajo Area Offices. 
Appellees claimed that implementation and enforcement 
of the new preference policy "placed and will continue to 
place [appellees] at a distinct disadvantage in competing 
for promotion and training programs with Indian em-
ployees, all of which has and will continue to subject the 
[appellees] to discrimination and deny them equal em~ 
ployment opportunity.'' 
A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. § 2282 because the complaint sought to enjoin, 
as unconstitutional, the enforcement of a federal statute. 
Appellant Amerind, a nonprofit organization representing 
Indian employees of the BIA, moved to intervene in 
support of the preference; this motion was granted by 
the District Court and Amerind thereafter participated 
at all stages of this litigation, 
1 
After a short trial focusing primarily on how the new 
policy, in fact, has been implemented, the District Court 
concluded that the Indian preference was implicitly re-
pealed by § 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. ll1, 42 U. S. C. 
(Supp. II 1973) § 2000e-16 (a), proscribing discrimina-
tion in most federal employment on the basis of race.6 
6 Section 2000e-16 (a) rrads : 
"All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for em-
ployment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits 
of the United States) in military departments as defined in section 
102 of Title 5, in executive agencies (other than the General Ac-
counting Office) as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including em-
ployees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonap-
propriated funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal 
Rate Commissioner, in those units of the Government of the DistricL 
of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those 
units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Govern-
ment having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library 
. 
' 
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Having found that Congress repealed the preference, it 
was unnecessary for the District Court to pass on its 
constitutionality. The court permanently enjoined ap-
pellants "from implementing any policy in the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs which would hire, promote, or reassign 
any person in preference to another solely for the reason 
that such person is an Indian." The execution and ~n~ 
forcement of the judgment of the District Court was 
stayed by MR. JusTICE MARSHALL on August 16, 1973; 
pending the disposition of this appeal. 
II 
The federal policy of according some hiring preference ~ 
to Indians in the Indian service dates at least as far back 
as 1834.7 Since that time, Congress repeatedly has en-
?-Cted variOUS preferences of the general type here at 
issue.8 The purpose of these preferences, as variously 
expressed in the legislative history, has been to give In-
i:lians a greater participation m their own self-
of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
7 Act of June 30, 1834, § 9, 4 Stat. 737, 25 U. S. C. § 45 : 
"In all cases of the appointments of interpreters or other per~on::; 
employed for the benefit of the Indians, a preference shall be given 
to persons of Indian descent, if such can be found, who arc properly 
qualified for the execution of the duties." 
8 Act of May 17, 1882, § 6, 22 Stat. 88, and Act of July 4, 18841 
§ 6, 23 Stat. 97, 25 U.S. C.§ 46 (employment of clerical, mechanical, 
and other help on reservations and about agencies); Act of August 15, 
1894, § 10, 28 Stat. 313, 25 U. S. C. § 44 (employment of herder::;, 
teamsters, and laborers, "and where practicable in all other em-
ployments" in the Indian service) ; Act of June 7, 1897, § 1, 30 Stat. 
83, 25 U. S. C. § 274 (employment as matrons, farmers, and in-
dustrial teachers in Indian schools) ; Act of June 25, 1910, § 23, 36 
Stat. 861, 25 U. S. C. § 47 (general preference as to Indian labor and 
iJroducts of Indian industry). 
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government; 9 to further the Government's trust obliga-
tion toward the Indian tribes; 10 and to reduce the nega-
tive eft'ect of having non-Indians administer matters 
that afi'ect Indian triballife.11 
The preference directly at issue here was enacted as 
an important part of the sweeping Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934. The overriding purpose of that particular 
Act was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes 
would be able to assume a greater degree of self-govern-
ment, both politically and economically.12 Congress was 
9 Senator Wheeler, co-sponsor of the 1934 Act, explained the need 
for a preference as follows: 
"We are setting up in the United States a civil service rule which 
prevents Indians from managing their own property. It is an en-
tirely different service from anything else in the United States be-
cause these Indians own this property. It belongs to them. What 
this policy of this Government is and what it should be is to teach 
these Indians to manage their own business and control their own 
funds and to administer their own property, and the civil service 
has worked very poorly so far as the Indian Service is concerned ... . " 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on S. 2755 
and S. 3645 (Part 2), 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 256 (1934). 
10 A letter, contained in the House Report to the 1934 Act, from 
President F. D. Roosevelt to Congressman Howard states: 
"We can and should, without further delay, extend to the Indian 
the fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-government 
and the opportunities of education and economic assistance that they 
require in order to attain a wholesome American life. This is but 
the obligation of honor of a powerful nation toward a people living 
among u;; and dependent upon our protection." H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 ( 1934). 
11 "If the Indians are exposed to any danger, there is none greater 
than the residence among them of unprincipled white men." H. R. 
Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 98 (1834) (letter dated 
February 10, 1834, from Indian Commissioners to the Secretary of 
War . 
12 As explained by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs: 
"[T] his bill is designed not to prevent the absorption of Indians in 
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seeking to modify the then-existing situation whereby 
the primarily non-Indian-staffed BIA had plenary con-
trol, for all practical purposes, over the lives and destinies 
of the federally recognized Indian tribes. Initial con-
gressional proposals would have diminished substantially 
the role of the BIA by turning over to fed€rally chartered 
self-governing Indian communities many bf the func-
tions normally performed by the Bureau.' 3 Committe€ 
sentiment, however, ran against such a radical change 
in the role of the BIA.14 The solution ultimately 
adopted was to strengthen tribal government while con,. 
tinuing the active role of the BIA, with the understand-
ing that the Bureau would be more responsive to the 
interests of the people it was created to serve. 
One of the primary means by which self-government 
would be fostered and the Bureau made more responsive 
was to increase the participation of tribal Indians in 
the BIA operations.15 In order to achieve this end, it 
was recognized that some kind of preference and exemp-
tion from otherwise prevailing civil service requirements 
or unable to compete in the white world some measures of self-gov-
ernment in their own affairs." Hearings on S. 2755 before the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs (Part 1), 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 26 (1934). 
13 Hearings before the House Committee on Indian Affairs on 
H. R. 7902, Readjustment of Indian Affairs, 73d Cong.,, 2d Sess., 1-7 
1934 [House Hearings]. See also Mescalaro Apache Tribe v. Jones, 
411 U. S. 145, 152-153, fn. 9 (1973). 
14 House Hearings 491-497. 
15 "[Section 12] was intended to integrate the Indian into the 
government service connected with the administration of his af-
fairs . Congress was anxious to promote economic and political self-
, determination for the Indian" (footnote omitted). Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Hickel, 432 F. 2d :956, 960 (CAIO 1970), cert. 
·denied, ·401 U. S. 981 (1971'). 
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was 11ecessary.1 r. Congressman Howard, the House 
sponsor, expressed the need for the preference: 
"The Indians have not only been thus deprived 
of civic rights and powers, but they have been largely 
deprived of the opportunity to enter the more im-
portant positions in the service of the very bureau 
which manages their affairs. Theoretically, the In-
dians have the right to qualify for the Federal civil 
service. In actual practice there has been no ade-
quate program of training to qualify Indians to 
compete in these examinations, especially for tech-
nical and higher positions; and even if there were 
such training, the Indians would have to compete 
under existing law, on equal terms with multitudes 
of white applicants . . . . The various services on 
the Indian reservations are actually local rather 
than Federal services and are comparable to local 
municipal and county services, since they are deal-
ing with purely local Indian problems. It should 
be possible for Indians with the requisite vocational 
and professional training to enter the service of their 
own people without the necessity of competing with 
white applicants for these positions. This bill per-
mits them to do so," 78 Cong. Rec. 11729 (1934), 
Congress was well aware that the proposed preference 
would result in employment disadvantages within the 
• 16 "The bill admits qualified Indians to the position [~ic] in their 
own service. 
"Thirty-four years ago, in 1900, the number of Indians holding 
regular positions in the Indian Service, in proportion to the total of 
positions, was greater than it is today. 
"The reason primarily is found in the application of the genrrahzed 
civil service to the Indian Service, and the consequent exclusion of 
Indian::; from their own jobs." House Hearings 19 (Memorandum 
dated February 19, 1934, submitted by Commissioner Collier to the 
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BIA for non-Indians.' 7 Not only was this displacement 
unavoidable if room were to be made for Indians, but it 
was explicitly determined that gradual replacement of 
non-Indians with Indians within the Bureau was a de-
sirable feature of the entire program for self-govern-
ment.18 Since 1934, the BIA has implemented the pref-
ereiiCe with a fair degree of success. The percentage of 
Indians employed in the Bureau rose from 34o/o in 1934 
to 57% in 1972. This reversed the former downward 
trend, see n. 16. supra, and was due, clearly, to the pres-
ence of the 1934 Act. The Commissioner's extension 
of the preference in 1972 to promotio11s within the BIA 
was designed to bring more Indians into positions of re-
sponsibility and, in that regard, appears to be a logical 
extension of the congressional intent. See Freeman V. 
Morton, supra, and n. 5, supra .. 
III 
It is against this background that we encounter the 
first issue in the present case: whether the Indian pref-
erence was repealed by the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972~ Title· VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, was the first major piece of federal 
1 ' Rep. Carter, an opponent of the bill, placed in the Congressional 
Record the following obHervation by Commissioner Collier at the 
Committee Hearings: 
"[W]e muHt not blind ourselves to the fact that the effect of this bill 
if worked out would unquestionably be to replace white employees by 
Indian employees. I do not know how fast, but ultimately it ought 
to go very far indeed." 78 Cong. Rec. 11737 ( 1934). 
18 "It should be possible for Indians to enter the service of their 
own people without running the gauntlet of competition with whites 
for these positions. Indian progress and ambition will be enormously 
strengthened as soon as we adopt the principle that the Indian 
Service shall gradually become, in fact as well as in name, an Indial'l 
service predominantly in the hands of educated and competent 
IndianA." 78 Cong. Rec . 11731 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Howard) ,. 
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legislation prohibiting discrimination in private employ~ 
ment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin." 42 U. S. C. § 20000e-2 (a). Significantly, 
§§ 701 (b) and 703 (i) of that Act explicitly exempted 
from its coverage the preferential employment of Indians 
by Indian tribes or by industries located on or near In-
dian reservations. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e (b) and 2000e-
2 (i) .10 This exemption reveals a clear congressional 
recognition, within the framework of Title VII, of the 
unique legal status of tribal and reservation-based activ-
ities. The Senate sponsor, Senator Humphrey, stated on 
the floor by way of explanation: 
"This exemption is consistent with the Federal 
Government's policy of encouraging Indian em-
ployment and with the special legal position of In-
dians." 110 Cong. Rec. 12723 (1964). 20 
The 1964 Act did not specifically outlaw employment 
discrimination by the federal government.21 Yet the 
10 Section 2000e (b) excludes "an Indian Tribe" from the Act's 
definition of "employer." Section 2000e-2 (i) states: 
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business 
or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect, to any 
publicly announced employment practice of such business or enter-
prise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual 
because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation." 
20 Senator Mundt supported these exemptions on the Senate floor 
by claiming that they would allow Indians "to benefit from Indian 
preference programs now in operation or later to be instituted." 
110 Cong. Rec. 13702 (1964) . 
21 The 1964 Act, however, did contain a proviso, expressed in some~ 
what precatory language : 
"That it shall be the policy of the United States to insure equal 
employment opportunjties for Federal employees without discrimi-
nation because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 78 
Stat. 254, 
This statement of policy was reenacted as 5 U. S. C. § 7151, 80 Stat, 
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mechanism for enforcing long-outstanding Executive 
Orders forbidding government discrimination had proved 
ineffective for the most part. 22 In order to remedy this, 
Congress, by the 1972 Act, amended the 1964 Act and 
proscribed discrimination in most areas of federal gov-
ernment. See n. 6, supra. In general, it may be said 
that the substantive anti-discrimination law embraced 
in '@:e VII was carried over and applied to the Federal 
Government. As stated in the House Report; 
"To correct this entrenched discrimination in th~ 
Federal service, it is necessary to insure th~ effec• 
tive application of uniform, fair and stron~ly en• 
forced policies. The present law and the proposed 
statute do not permit industry and labor organiza-
tions to be the judges of their own conduct in the 
area of employment discrimination; There is no 
reason why government agencies should not be 
treated similarly." H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, on H. R. 
1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1971). 
Nowhere in the legislative history of the 1972 Act, how-
ever, is there any mention of Indian preference. 
Appellees assert, and the District Court held, that 
since the 1972 Act proscribed racial discrimination in 
government employment, the Act necessarily, albeit sub 
silentio, repealed the provision of the 1934 Act, that 
22 "This disproportionatte [sic] distribution of minorities and 
women throughout the Federal bureaucracy and their exclusion from 
higher level policy-making and supervisory positions indicates the 
government's failure to pursue its policy of equal opportunity. 
"A critical defect of the Federal equal employment program has 
been the failure of the complaint process. That process has im-
peded rather than advanced the goal of the elimination of discrimina-
tion in Federal employment." H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, on H. R, 
1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 23-24 (1911) . 
•. 
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called for the preference in the BIA of one racial group, 
Indians, over non-Indians: 
"When a conflict such as in this case, is present, 
the most reoent law or Act should apply and the 
conflicting Preferences passed some 39 years earlier 
should be impliedly repealed." Brief for Appellee& 
7o 
We disagree, For several r!;)asons we conclude that 
Congress did not intend to repeal the Inqian :prefereno~ 
;:too that The 'DJ.strict Court erred in holding that it was 
repealed . 
. First: There are the abqv!;)-mentioned affirmative :pro-
visions in the 1964 Act excluding covera~e of tribal em-
ployment and of preferential treatment by a business or 
enterprise on or near a reservation. 4~ u. s. c. 
§§ 2000e (b) and :2000e-~ (i). See n, 19, supra. These 
1964 exemptions as to private employment indicate Con .. 
gress' recognition of the longstanding federal policy of 
providing a unique legal status to Indians ip mattel;'1? 
concerning tribal or "on or near" reservation employ-
ment. The exemptions reveal a clear congressional sei1-
timent that an Indian preference in the narrow conte:ll;t 
of tribal or reservation-related employment did not 
constitute racial discrimination of the type otherwise 
proscribed. In extending the general anti-discrimination 
machinery to federal employment in 1972, Congress in 
no way modified these private employment preferences 
built into the 1964 Act, and they are still in effect. It 
would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended 
to eliminate the longstanding statutory preferences in 
BIA employment, as being racially discriminatory, at the 
very same time it was reaffirming the right of tribal and 
reservation-related private employers to provide Indian 
preference. Appellees' assertion that Congress implicitly 
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retaining the 1964 preferences, attributes to Congress 
irrationality and arbitrariness, an attribution we do not 
share. 
Second: Three months after Congress passed the 1972 
amendments, it enacted two new Indian preference laws. 
These were part of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
86 Stat. 235, 20 U. S. C. (Supp. II 1973) §§ 887c (a) 
and (d), and § 1119a. The new laws explicitly require 
that Indians be given preference in government programs 
for training teachers of Indian children, It is improb-
able, to say the least, that the same Congress which affir• 
matively approved and enacted these additional and 
similar Indian preferences was, at the same time, con• 
demning the BIA preference as racially discriminatory. 
In the total absence of any manifestation of supportive 
intent, we are loathe to imply this improbable result. 
Third: Indian preferences, for many years, have been 
treated as exceptions to Executive Orders forbidding 
government employment discrimination.2 :J The 1972 ex-
tension of the Civil Rights Act to government employ-
ment is in large part merely a codification of prior anti-
discrimination Executive Orders that had proved ineffec-
tive because of inadequate enforcement machinery. 
There certainly was no indication that the substantive 
23 Sec. e. g., Ex. Order 7423, .July 26, 1936, 1 Fed. Reg. 885-886, 
When President Eisenhower issued an Order prohibiting discrimina~ 
tion on the basis of race in the civil service, Exec. Order 1057.7, 
No 22, 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521, § 4.2, he left standing earlier Execu-
ttve Orders containing exceptions for the Indian service. I d., § 301, 
Src also 5 CFR § 213.3112 (a) (7) (1974), which provides a civil 
~crvice exemption for : 
''All positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other positions 
in the Department of the Interior directly and primarily related to 
the providing of services to Indians when filled by the appointment of 
Indian:; who are one-fourth or more Indian blood." 
See al:;o ·5 1CF-R § 213.3116 (b)(8) (1~74) (Indian Health Services), 
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proscription against discrimination was intended to be 
any broader than that which previously existed. By 
codifying the existing anti-discrimination provisions, and 
by providing enforcement machinery for them, there 
is no reason to presume that Congress affirmatively in-
tended to erase the preferences that previously had co-
existed with broad anti-discrimination provisiOns m 
Executive Orders. 
Fourth: Appellees encounter head-on the "cardinal 
rule ... that repeals by implication are not favored." 
Posedas v. 1\·ational City Ba:nk, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1963); 
Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342-343, 363 (1842); 
Universal Interpretative Shuttle Corp. v. Washington 
M etropolttan Area Tra·nsit Comm'n, 393 U. S. 186, 193 
( 1968). Th and the District Court read the congres-
SIOnal silence as ffectuating a repeal by implication. 
There is nothing in the legislative history, however, that 
indicates affirmatively any congressional intent to repeal 
the 1934 preference. Indeed, as explained above, there 
is ample independent evidence that the legislative intent 
was to the contrary. 
This is a prototypical case where an adjudication of 
repeal by implication is not appropriate. The prefer-
ence is a longstanding, important component of the 
Government's Indian program. The anti-discrimination 
provision, aimed at alleviating minority discrimination 
in employment, obviously is designed to deal with an 
entirely different and. indeed, opposite problem. Any 
perceived conflict is thus more apparent than real. 
Iu the absence of some affirmative showing of an in-
tention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a 
repeal by implication is when the earlier and later stat-
utes are irreconcilable. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
324 U. S. 439, 456-457 (1945). Clearly, this is not the 
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government by according an employment preference 
within the BIA for qualified members of the governed 
group can readily co-exist with a general rule prohibiting 
employment discrimination on the basis of race. Any 
other conclusion can be reached only by formalistic rea-
soning that ignores both the history and purposes of the 
preference and the unique legal relationship between the 
Federal Government and tribal Indians. 
Furthermore, the Indian preference sta.tute is a spe-
cific provision applying to a very specific situation. The 
1972 Act, on the other hand, is of general application. 
Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific 
statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general 
one, regardless of the priority of enactment. See, e. g., 
Bulova liT' atch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 758 
(1961); Rodgers v. United States, 185 U. S. 83, 87-89 
(1902) . 
The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among \ 
congressional enactments, and when two statutes are 
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, ab-
sent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the 
contrary, to regard each as effective. "When there are 
two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect 
to both if possible . . . . The intention of the legislature 
to repeal 'must be clear and manifest.' " United States 
v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939). Moreover, 
even if there were a doubt, it. is well established that 
legislative ambiguities touching on the Government's 
role as guardian of Indian tribes "are to be resolved in 
favor of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards 
of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection 
and good faith " Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 
(1912); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 582 (1832); 
United States v Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 290 ( 1909); 
Squire \'. Capoernan, 351 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1956); McClana-
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han v Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 174 
(1973) . In light of the factors indicating no repeal, we 
simply caunot conclude that Congress consciously aban-
doned its policy of furthering Indian self-government 
when it passed the 1972 amendments. 
We therefore hold that the District Court erred in 
holding that the Indian preference was repealed by the 
1972 Act. 
IV 
We still must decide whether, as the appellees contend, I 
the preference constitutes invidious racial discrimina-
tion in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). 
The District Court, while pretermitting this issue, said, 
" [ W] e could well hold that the statute must fail on con-
stitutional grounds." 359 F. Supp., at 591. 
Whatever may be the constitutional consequences of 
a case of purely benign racial discrimination, cf. DeFunis 
v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P. 2d 1169 (1973), 
vacated as moot and remanded, - U. S. - (1974), 
this is not such a ca:se, Resolution of the instant issue 
turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under 
federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress, 
based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a 
"guardian-ward" status, to legislate on behalf of federally 
recognized Indian tribes. The plenary power of Con-
gress to deal with the special problems of Indians is 
drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitu-
tion itself. Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with 
the power to "reg_ulateK Commerce ... with the Indian 
Tribes,' ' and thus, to t 1s extent, singleslndians out aS' )~ 
a~· subject for separate legislation. Article II, § 2, V \ 
cl 2, gives the President the power, by and with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties. This 
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with the ln<han tY.ibes. 'The Court has described the 
origin and nature of the special relationship: 
"In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the 
United States overcame the Indians and took pos-
session of their lauds, sometimes by force, leaving 
them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people, 
needing protection against the selfishness of others 
and their own improvidence. Of necessity, the 
United States assumed the duty of furnishing that 
protection, and with it the authority to do all that 
was required to perform that obligation and to 
prepare the Indians to take their place as independ-
ent, qualified members of the modern body politic." 
Board of County Cornm'rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 
715 (1943) . 
See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383-384 
(1886). 
Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian I 
tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation deal-
ing with the BIA, single out for special treatment a con-
stituency of tribal Indians living on or near reserva-
tions. If these laws, derived from historical relation-
ships and explicitly designed to help only Indians, were 
deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title 
of thr United States Code (25 U. S. C.) would be effec-
tively erased and the solemn commitment of the Govern-
ment toward the Indians would be jeopardized. See 
Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 814 n. 13 
(ED Wash. 1965). aff'd, 384 U. S. 209 (1966). 
It IS in this historical and legal context that the con-
stitutional validity of the Indian preference is to be de-
termined. As discussed above, Congress in 1934 de-
termined that proper fulfillment of its trust required 
turning over to the Indians a greater control of their 
own destinies. The overly paternalistic approach of 
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prior yPars had proved both exploitative and destructive 
of Indian lllt<'rests. Congress was united in the belief 
that institutional changes were required. An importa11t 
part of the Indian Rt>organization Act was the preferencE:' 
provision lwrr at issue . 
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, 
this preference docs not constitute "racial discrimina~ 
tion" Indeed, it is not even a "racial" preferencc.21 
Rather, it is an t>mploymcnt criterion reasonably de-
Signed to further the cause of Indian self-government 
and to makP the BIA more responsive to the needs of 
its constituent groups. It is directed to participation 
by the governed in tlw governing agency. The pref-
erence is similar in kind to the constitutional require-
ment that a United States Senator, when elected, be "an 
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosc11," 
"' Thr prPf<'rrnr<' •~ not dir!'rtrd toward~ a ··racwl" group ron~i~t­
illp; of ··Indian,;"; in~trad, it applir::; onl~· to mrmbrr::; of "frdNally 
reeop;mz<'d" t ribr;;. Thi~ opNntr~ to exrludr man~· inclividuab who 
nrc• ra<·wll~· to h<• rla~~ifird a~ ·' Indian~. " In thi~ ~rn,;e, tlw prrfrr-
rncr •~ political rathrr than rarinl in naturr. Thr rligibility critrria 
apprar in 4A BIA:\[ :~:~5, :u . 
" l PoiiC~·-An Indian has prd<'r<'Jlrr 111 appomtmrnt 1ll thP Bu-
]"('<111. To h<' elip;ibiP for prrfNPneP m appointmrnt, promotiOn, and 
t raming, an mdividual mu~t hr onr-fourt h or morr drgn•<• 1 ndian 
blood and IJp a mPmhPr of '' Fedrrall~·-rpr<Jgmz('(l tnbr. It i~ thr 
pohr~· for promotional <"OJJ~Hlf'l"atwn that whrrr two or man• cnnc!J-
datP~ who nwrt thr <'~tab!J~hrd qualification rPquirrmrnt~ arp avali-
nhh• for filing :t vacant·~·. 1f onr of thrm 1~ an Indian, lw ~hall bt• 
g;1vrn prdrrc•ncr 111 filling t hP vncanc~·. In arrordanc<• wit It t IH' 
pohc~· ~tatrmPnt approwd h~· thr Srcn•tary, thr Commi~HionPr ma.\' 
grant <'XCC']ltJOn~ to th1~ pohe~· by approving thr ~Pirrtion and ap-
JlOlnlmPnt of non-lndwn~. whrn hr con~idPr~ It 111 thr br~t JntNr~t 
of thr Bumtu 
""Th1~ program do<·~ not rp,.;tnet t hr np;ht of managrm!'nt to fill 
po~JtJon~ by mrthod~ othrr than through promotiOn. Po~ition~ may 
hr fillrd h~ , trnn~frr,;, rpa~~•p;nment, rrm~tatrmrnt, or initial 
<lppomt mrnt " App 9:2 
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.\rt. T. ~ 3. cl. 3, or that a m0mber of a city council reside 
within tlw city governed by the council. Congress has 
sought only to enable the BIA to draw more heavily from 
among the constituent group in staffing its projects, all of 
which. either directly or indirectly, affect the lives of 
tribal Indians. The preference, as applied, is granted to 
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as 
members of quasi~sovercign tribal entities whose lives 
and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique 
fashion . See n. 24, supra. In the sense that there is no 
otlwr group of people favored in this manner, the legal 
status of the BIA is truly sui geueris.t" Furthermore, 
the preference applies only to employment in the Indian 
service. The preference does not cover any other gov-
C'rnment agency or activity, and wc need not consider the 
obviously more difficult question that would be presented 
by a blanket cx<>mption for I ndiaus from all civil service 
Pxaminations. Here, the preference is reasonably and 
dirf'ctly rf'lated to a legitimate. nonracially based goaL 
This is the principal characteristic that generally is ab-
sent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination . 
On numerous occasions tbis Court specifically has up-
held legislation that singles out Indians for particular 
and special treatment. See, e. g., Board of County 
Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705 (1943) (federally 
granted tax immunity); McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Cornm'n, 411 r. S. 164 (1973) (same); Simmons' v. 
Eagle Seelatsee, 384 r. S. 209 (1966), affirming, 244 F. 
Supp. 808 (ED Wash. 1965) (statutory definition of 
tribal membership. with resulting interest in trust 
estatP). Williams r Lee, 358 l" S. 217 (1959) (tribal 
~ n Re1wtor Whr<>ler det<cnbrd thr BIA a:; "an entirdy diffcrrnt 
~Nncr from an~·thinp; rlt<r in thr Unitrd State:; ." Hearing:; brfore 
thr. Senatr Commtttre on Indian Affair~ on S 2755 and S. :~645 
( Part. :.n , i:{d C'ong., 2d Sess ., 256 (19;34) . 
~. 
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<;ourts and their jurisdiction over reservation affairs) . 
Cf. Morton v. Ruiz, - U. S.- (1974) (federal wel-
fare benefits for Indians "on or near" reservations). 
This unique legal status is of long standing, see Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 ( 1831) ; Worcester v. Georgia, 
6 Pet. 515 ( 1832) , and its sources are diverse. See, gen-
erally, U. S. Dept. of Interior, Federal Indian Law 
(19,58); Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Deter-
mination, 58 Cal. L. Rev. 445 (1970). As long as the 
special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment 
of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such 
legislative judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where 
the preference is reasonable and rationally designed to 
further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Con-
gress' classification violates due process. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed 
It is so ordered. 
/ 
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